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AbsTrACT
There is a growing body of literature that has sought to 
undermine systems of ethical regulation, and governance 
more generally, within the social sciences. In this 
paper, we argue that any general claim for a system of 
research ethics governance in social research depends 
on clarifying the nature of the stake that society has in 
research. We show that certain accounts of this stake—
protecting researchers’ freedoms; ensuring accountability 
for resources; safeguarding welfare; and supporting 
democracy—raise relevant ethical considerations that 
are reasonably contested. However, these accounts 
cannot underpin a general claim in favour of, or against, 
a system of research ethics governance. Instead, we 
defend governance in social research on the grounds 
that research, as an institutionalised form of enquiry, is 
a constitutive element of human flourishing, and that 
society ought to be concerned with the flourishing of its 
members. We conclude by considering the governance 
arrangements that follow from, and are justified by, our 
arguments.
InTroduCTIon
A growing body of literature has launched severe 
attacks on systems of ethical regulation, and gover-
nance more generally, within the social sciences. 
These criticisms question the value, need and 
appropriateness of governance arrangements, some 
even claiming that ethics review of social research 
is unethical.
In this paper, we respond to the ethical and prac-
tical claims underpinning these challenges. We do 
not simply debunk these claims in order to justify 
the ethics governance of social research. Instead, 
we address two related challenges about the rela-
tionship between governance and social research in 
order to comment on the appropriateness, or not, 
of particular governance arrangements in the social 
sciences.
The first challenge is to provide an account of 
the relationship between research and society that 
can ground a general claim for a system of research 
ethics governance across the social sciences. A key 
requirement of such an account lies in its potential 
extension to other research ethics review contexts 
(eg, medical research), broader research governance 
issues (eg, patient and public involvement), and to 
non-empirical research in the social sciences and 
humanities. The second challenge is to justify and 
derive a form of governance arrangements from this 
account.
Against research ethics governance
Research ethics governance requirements for 
research with human subjects vary by country. 
Combined national statements in the USA and 
Canada require broadly the same of social research 
as biomedical, behavioural and even engineering 
research.1–3 In contrast, UK social research require-
ments are stand-alone and are set out by research 
councils and learnt societies. They apply to all 
researchers with membership or funding from these 
organisations.4–6 Such requirements also function 
less formally as best practice guidelines within insti-
tutions. Arguments against research ethics gover-
nance of social research target its requirements, its 
‘functions’ or bodies that provide research ethics 
review such as research ethics committees (RECs), 
and its nature as a system overall.
The Economic and Social Research 
Council (ESRC) Framework for Research Ethics6 is 
perhaps the paradigmatic example in the UK, and 
was a key driver for research ethics review of social 
research within UK universities.7 This document 
requires researchers to uphold ethical principles 
including informed consent, confidentiality, avoid-
ance of harm and conflict of interest declarations. 
The research must also meet certain minimum stan-
dards of ethical review, approval and monitoring. 
Failures to uphold principles or requirements 
are called to account by the ESRC and sanctions 
applied. These include the immediate suspension of 
project funding, and a halt to considering further 
applications from the researcher or their employing 
institution.
Unsurprisingly, a backlash has followed which 
mirrors medical researchers’ reactions to the 
formalising of UK research ethics governance in 
the 1990s.8 In the remainder of this section, we 
consider a range of claims (ethical and practical) 
made against research ethics governance.
Ethical claims against research ethics governance
Three broad kinds of ethical claims are made 
against research ethics governance: (1) that RECs, 
as the key component of research governance, rely 
on an ethical authority that they do not possess, (2) 
that research ethics governance violates a right to 
research and (3) that in social research there is a 
lack of harm rendering regulation unwarranted. We 
discuss each of these in turn.
The first claim questions the authority of RECs, 
as suggested by Hammersley’s comment that 
REC authority is ‘presumably based on an appeal 
to expertise’.9 RECs have authority to approve 
research because of their expertise in ethical deci-
sion-making. But the objection questions both 
the fact of REC expertise and any robust and 
defensible concept of such expertise. Hammers-
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examining how RECs actually function. As Dixon-Woods et al 
suggest:
The authority of RECs’ decisions derives not from their appeal 
to the moral superiority of any ethical position, but through their 
place in the organisational structure and the social positioning of 
the parties to the process thus implied.10
A more robust concern about REC authority focuses on the 
normative legitimacy of RECs: what is the justification for a 
system or process of ethics governance? Answering this question 
will engage with how processes more generally can be justified 
(rather than how they come to be taken as justified).11i This form 
of the question cannot be lightly dismissed despite attempts to 
do so, for example, by branding research ethics governance an 
indefensible form of ‘moralism’.7 How to answer this question 
lies at the heart of the current paper.
The second kind of ethical claim against research ethics gover-
nance appeals to a right to conduct research, and takes several 
forms. Taking regulation as censorship and research as analogous 
to speech and expression, the right to research involves freedom 
of speech and expression.11 This right is unjustifiably impinged 
in social research compared with, say, journalism.12 On these 
views research ethics governance infringes freedom of speech. 
Alternatively, research involves the right to privacy: research is 
our private business so long as it does not harm others. Finally, 
we might view researcher autonomy as the right that is threat-
ened by research ethics governance.13
The final ethical claim made against research ethics governance 
involves the overall lack of harm in social research. Although it is 
legitimate to curtail the right to research because of risk of harm 
to others, social research is not risky enough to warrant this:
HSS researchers do nothing that begins to compare with injecting 
someone with potentially toxic green stuff that cannot be neutralised 
or rapidly eliminated from their body if something goes wrong.11
These three claims, and our response to them, are important 
for our arguments about the relationship between society and 
social research in the next section.
Practical claims against research ethics governance
A second category of claims are more practically oriented, but 
retain their ethical force. An impractical system will generally 
be unethical: it will be inefficient, ineffective and undermine the 
benefits of social research.
First, the governance of any research involves costs that affect 
the justification of governance generally and consideration of 
its appropriate form. A commonly encountered practical form 
of governance—the process of research ethics review—incurs 
process costs: the research time, money and effort involved in, 
and arguably wasted on, administration and regulatory compli-
ance.14–16 Process costs generate a further ethical concern: 
that the process supplants proper consideration of the ethics. 
Researchers might concentrate getting through the ethics, 
or jumping ‘hoops’ to approval, rather than addressing the 
i  Buchanan and Keohane distinguish normative and sociological legit-
imacy, thus: ‘“Legitimacy” has both a normative and a sociological 
meaning. To say that an institution is legitimate in the normative sense 
is to assert that it has the right to rule—where ruling includes promul-
gating rules and attempting to secure compliance with them by attaching 
costs to noncompliance and/or benefits to compliance. An institution is 
legitimate in the sociological sense when it is widely believed to have the 
right to rule’.42 Dingwall11 discusses legitimacy in the sociological sense 
but not in the normative sense.
reason for the ‘hoops’.9 17 18 This might breed cynicism among 
researchers towards the process and negatively affect their 
appreciation of ethical standards and conduct in research.19
Second, significant elements of the medical research ethics 
governance model have been inappropriately imported into the 
social sciences given (1) its lack of risk of harm,11 (2) its freer 
approach to consent20–22 and (3) its different methodologies.23–25 
Clearly a system of research ethics governance that is unattuned 
to social research will be unable to weigh the appropriateness of 
different forms of consent and assess different kinds of harms 
and benefits to participants and society.
Our defence is mindful of the force of these practical 
points in a way that we are not for the ethical claims outlined 
above. In particular, the imposition of the ‘medical model’ of 
research ethics governance runs counter to whatever justifi-
cation of governance is available. It is important, however, 
that this ‘medical model’ objection is to a particular form of 
governance, and so cannot tell against a general justification 
for governance.
society’s stake in social research
Having discussed ethical and practical claims made against 
research ethics governance in social research, we now focus on 
the normative arguments for its governance, with research ethics 
review as one aspect of this. Our strategy here is to account for 
the relationship between research and society: if we can develop 
an account of what kind of stake society has in social research, 
and why it has such a stake, we will be in a position to make a 
claim about research ethics governance, and to say something 
about the form that such governance should take.ii
The four most plausible accounts of that stake are rooted in 
the following societal concerns: (1) the exercise of liberty of 
social researchers as members of society; (2) the accountability 
of social research for using society’s resources; (3) the welfare, 
protection from harm and respect of social research participants; 
and (4) social research as a democratic requirement. Examining 
these accounts will determine whether one or more of them can 
ground a general claim for governance. We will conclude that 
none of them can achieve this grounding, but that they do raise 
relevant considerations that are reasonably contested, and there-
fore relevant to research ethics governance.
The libertarian account
The arguments discussed in the first section take a broadly liber-
tarian position: research is an exercise of individual liberty that 
ought to be respected and not interfered with unless harming 
others and their liberty. On this account, the state, as a vehicle 
of society, should only provide resources to enable freedom of 
choice to be acted on. Thus, the nature and direction of social 
research should be left to social researchers and not to any wider 
group. Social research is a way to exercise freedom in society via 
free speech or privacy rights. Society and its institutions should 
only intervene to protect individuals from harm or liberty 
infringements.
As outlined above, the libertarian account has been used to 
argue against ethical oversight of research.9 11 Indeed in the US 
context, research ethics oversight has been deemed an infringe-
ment on the First Amendment of the US Constitution.26
ii  There are a range of possible terms that might be used instead of 
‘stake’, including ‘investment’, ‘complicity’ and ‘responsibility’. While 
stake is perhaps rather generic, it does seem to be neutral enough to 
capture the character of the kind of relationship that we are looking 
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However the form of the right to research is understood, it 
is hard to see this right as absolute. Defamation laws provide 
the obvious example of the limits of freedom of speech. If the 
right to research is not absolute, when and how to overrule it 
is the more relevant question. The simple assertion of the right 
to research, given its existence is uncontroversial, contributes 
nothing to the debate.
Even if we accept this rights-based argument, we encounter 
another problem when we apply the argument to a social 
research example. One value of social research lies in is the ways 
in which it includes numerous, often unrepresented, voices, 
rather than simply reporting the voice of the researcher. This 
representativeness raises important questions about ownership 
of the research. There is a clear difficulty, for example, with the 
researcher straightforwardly claiming ownership over the voices 
or experiences of others. We may question a researcher’s right 
to free expression when applied to research that documents the 
experiences of others.
Accountability for resources
On this account, society provides the resources for the research 
and so is entitled to comment and impose its values on the 
research. Contrary to the libertarian position, such an account 
would justify a system of research ethics governance in terms 
of society’s financial or material investment in social research. 
Research ethics review would be one way of holding researchers 
to account to this investment.
One obvious objection is the fact that society does not 
always provide such resources. These resources might come 
from private donations or from charitable trusts. Second, when 
society does provide the resources for research, it may be paying 
for the system that manages the research rather than for partic-
ular research projects. Finally, even in cases where society does 
not provide the resources for research, we may still have residual 
intuitions about the relationship between science and society 
that facts about resourcing cannot entirely capture. These intu-
itions are illustrated by US stem cell research’s inability to calm 
the concerns it generated in society, despite its public funding 
being withdrawn.27 28
Welfare, protection from harm and respect for participants
In certain respects this account is the most intuitively plausible of 
the four. It holds that the state has an obligation both to protect 
society’s members and to promote their welfare. Moreover, the 
state should also be concerned with the way in which partici-
pants are treated, through, for example, the process of obtaining 
informed consent. Accordingly, the state has a supervisory role 
in research in order to ensure benefit and the avoidance of harm 
to research participants, and their respectful treatment. These 
considerations are central to the appropriateness of research 
ethics governance arrangements for medical research.29
As discussed in the first section, one of the main arguments 
made against the research ethics review of social research is 
its supposed overall lack of risk of harm. Thus even if welfare 
considerations do justify research ethics governance, they do not 
provide a general justification: when the risk of harm falls below 
a certain level, the welfare argument does not apply.
Although we agree with those who counter this position and 
suggest risks to social research participants may be underesti-
mated,30–32 it is also easy to inflate such risks when considering 
psychological distress or reputational damage. It is perhaps better 
to recognise that social research spans a spectrum of harms and 
benefits, with each project’s place on the spectrum individually 
determined. Given this spectrum, harm considerations alone 
cannot offer a general justification for research ethics gover-
nance. A second reason for caution about this approach is in the 
‘utilitarianisation’ of research—that the sole value of research 
lies in the extent of pre-emptively specified benefits that are 
traded against possible harms. Such an approach challenges a 
value of research for its own sake and should be treated with 
caution if it reduces that value to simplistic and outcome-based 
considerations.
Before moving on, however, we emphasise that we are not 
arguing for dismissal of these considerations as irrelevant to 
questions about research ethics governance. Governance will 
weigh as many of these considerations (freedom, accountability, 
welfare, protection from harm and respect) as are raised by indi-
vidual research projects. Rather we take issue with their ability 
to function as accounts and so provide a general grounding for 
the claim that society has a stake in social research.
Research as a democratic requirement
On this account, democratic citizenship requires that individuals 
can enquire about the society in which they live. Research as a 
specific form of enquiry sits within the appropriate functioning 
of democratic culture and institutions, rather than flowing from 
a basic human right connected to exercising freedoms.33 Thus, 
democratic institutions enable free enquiry that both helps citi-
zens to function within society and supports the foundations of 
democracy itself.
This claim looks persuasive, but only in a democratic society 
context, and so fails to ground a general claim about the stake 
that society has in research. Even if all societies were demo-
cratic, this politicisation of the relationship between enquiry and 
social life fails to grasp what is important about it. Research is 
more fundamental than simply being a product of democratic 
government.
Enquiry as a constitutive element of human flourishing
We now turn to a fifth account of the stake that society has in 
social research. We believe that this account adequately explains 
and grounds the stake that society has in research. As such, it 
is important for justifying and shaping a practical framework 
for governance. In developing this account we use a persuasive, 
central element of the democratic account discussed above: its 
location of enquiry and research within the grasp of society, 
rather than removed from it. However, as we have argued, a 
specifically democratic location misses something important 
about the nature of enquiry that transcends politics. Instead, a 
more fundamental account of the relationship between enquiry 
and human social life is required.
Enquiry and human life are intertwined and interdependent. 
To be human is to be curious, to ask questions about yourself, 
the world and your place in the world. This process of enquiry 
is undertaken individually, but is a social activity. It involves 
reflecting on what we value about ourselves in our relationships 
with others, and how we should collaboratively live our lives 
in ways that we think are good. By asking these questions we 
shape our own lives, and the lives of others, in particular ways—
both in the process of asking such questions, and in the answers 
arrived at in consultation with others. As we shape our lives 
in these ways, the questions that we ask (about ourselves, our 
relationships with others and our place in the world) develop 
in an iterative process of enquiry. In this way, enquiry becomes 
embedded within the functioning of societies, with social life 
also arising from, and transformed by, enquiry. At the broad soci-
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We can understand research as the institutionalisation of 
enquiry. Over time, these institutions (universities or other 
settings) develop systems of enquiry formalised around certain 
conventions about how enquiry should be conducted and what 
forms of knowledge are valid. In this respect, the activities 
undertaken within academic disciplines, research centres and 
publishing houses shape, in various ways and to varying extents, 
the conduct of particular ‘academic’ forms of enquiry, and our 
social world.
Using this account of the role of enquiry, and of research as a 
particular institutionalised form of enquiry, we can return to the 
question of society’s stake in research. This account develops a 
claim of enquiry as being an important and indeed constitutive 
element of human flourishing: humans cannot flourish without 
enquiring. This claim is not simply about benefit or welfare 
maximisation. It comes from an Aristotelian tradition that 
understands human flourishing to involve not simply living with 
a certain levels of satisfaction and absence of harm, but engaging 
in particular forms of activity that are valuable irrespective of 
their outcome.34–36 Enquiry is, we suggest, one of these activi-
ties: a life may not go as well because of enquiry (ignorance may 
be bliss), but enquiry is necessary for flourishing (‘the unexam-
ined life is not worth living’).
Further, society should be concerned with the flourishing of 
its members. Although the characterisation of the relationship 
between a society and its individual members varies, almost all 
accounts posit a concern by society for its members because society 
is viewed as more than the accidental, rough colocation of individ-
uals. Most importantly, both our account of enquiry as a consti-
tutive element of human flourishing and society’s concern for its 
members are thin enough to include most political philosophies. So 
while overall accounts will vary in what counts as flourishing, and 
in society’s obligations to its members with respect to flourishing, 
most will include some form of societal obligation that should 
reference activities associated with enquiry.
This fifth account shows something important about both 
the existence of society’s stake in research and the nature of 
that stake: society has something to say about research because 
(1) research is an institutionalised form of enquiry, (2) enquiry 
is a constitutive element of human flourishing and (3) society 
should be concerned with the flourishing of its members.
Responses to our account
Before considering the ways in which our account can provide a 
general grounding for governance in social research, we consider 
some initial responses to this account of society’s stake in social 
research.
One apparent problem with this account is that it relies on a 
distinction between social research and other forms of enquiry 
that meet our criteria for human flourishing. There are many 
forms and types of enquiry; why think that research is relevantly 
distinct from these other forms, particularly given that there will 
be consequences for governance in making such a distinction? 
Without the distinction between research and other forms of 
enquiry, any general claim for governance in social research will 
falter, unless one is going to also make the claim for the need to 
govern all aspects of human life in which institutionalised and 
non-institutionalised enquiry occurs.
On our account, research is a particular form of institution-
alised enquiry that is distinct from other activities that take 
similar forms. Research has a status that other modes of enquiry, 
such as journalism, do not have, and the outputs of activities 
undertaken within these institutions have a distinct place in the 
public and political consciousness.
Moreover, the institutionalisation of enquiry within academic 
environments produces formalised arrangements between indi-
viduals who gather together with shared interests to develop 
research groupings of various forms. This system of formalised 
arrangements is characterised by historical trajectories and 
conventions about the objectives of research. Perhaps the 
clearest examples of this involve the redevelopment of meth-
odologies for generating particular kinds of understanding 
about the world that render certain forms of knowledge valid 
or invalid.
To illustrate this point, consider the difference between the 
research methodology of autoethnographyiii and the social 
practice of autobiography. At first look, these activities look 
similar: they both offer personal narrative accounts of life 
experience. If there is no relevant distinction between the 
two activities, our general claim to ground governance in 
social research would either fail or extend to activities such as 
autobiography.
On reflection, however, they display important differences. 
If a person wrote her autobiography, she could tell what-
ever life story she wished, however she wanted. Publication 
might, of course, be unlikely, and readers lacking. In contrast, 
a male anthropologist might conduct participatory research 
and attend antenatal classes to understand how men engage 
with antenatal services. He might fulfil his study objectives 
effectively by writing an autoethnographic account of his 
experiences, so capturing the male perspective. In conducting 
autoethnography, the researcher would be held accountable by 
the disciplinary traditions rendering this form of enquiry valid 
for knowledge production. These traditions require a partic-
ular kind of confessional and reflexive style in study analysis 
and publication that justifies its review and acceptance by the 
researcher’s peers.
These institutionalised traditions allow us to reject the claim 
of inconsistencies between the governance of social research and 
other forms of enquiry, which make research ethics governance 
in social research illegitimate. This is illustrated by developing 
the example introduced above. Suppose now that the man 
engaging in antenatal classes was a journalist who intended to 
publish his experiences in a newspaper, with the hope that men 
re-evaluate their preparental obligations. Again, this activity 
looks like autoethnography and ought to be classed as research. 
But, for this claim to work, this journalistic activity would need 
to be entirely consistent with the institution-specific traditions 
that validate certain kinds of knowledge production and dissem-
ination, and which define research. Of course, if this were the 
case, then he would no longer be enquiring as a journalist, but 
as a researcher. And, on the basis of the account of the stake that 
society has in research outlined above, his activities ought to be 
governed as a piece of research.
The justification, then, for governing research stems from 
research’s particular kind of involvement in our capacity to 
flourish as individuals within society. The exalted place of 
research in the institutional order of contemporary societies 
means that the understandings that emerge from research are 
taken seriously: they form policy and lead to changes in indi-
viduals’ lives in ways that contribute to, or detract from, their 
flourishing as human beings in society. Let us be clear: it does 
not follow from this that research should be governed, and that 
iii  A reflexive account of a researcher’s experiences of life in the field 
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other institutionalised forms of enquiry should not be governed. 
Even if we recognise that research and, say, journalism differ, this 
does not imply that journalism (whether institutionalised within 
the media or otherwise) ought not to undergo ethical oversight 
and other governance mechanisms.
outlining a system of research ethics governance
Where are we to this point? After presenting and developing the 
context in which research ethics governance has been criticised 
and exploring these kinds of criticisms, we turned our attention 
to the question of society’s stake in research. We argued that, in 
order to develop a constructive account about the acceptability 
or otherwise of ethics governance, we need to be clearer about 
why society should have something to say about research under 
its auspices. The previous two sections considered a range of 
possible accounts of this stake, culminating in the last section 
our preferred account: understanding research, via the idea of 
enquiry, as importantly associated with human flourishing, and 
so as something about which society ought to be concerned. The 
other accounts helped to consider what research should take 
place but failed ultimately to provide a general grounding for the 
stake that society has in research. In this respect we are left with 
a set of relevant ethical considerations that are broadly captured 
as (1) the liberty of researchers and the right to research, (2) the 
accountability for the use of resources and (3) welfare, protec-
tion from harm and respecting research participants.
What remains is to explore how these ingredients lead to an 
account of the justifiability of governance and the form of that 
governance. Governance is, after all, only one way for society to 
exercise its stake in research.
Being clear about the question that needs addressing is an 
important step. We take it that the relevant question is about 
what (specific piece of) research ought to be conducted. This is 
certainly the question that we have been considering throughout 
this paper and it is the question that RECs are set up to answer. 
Other questions about research and the involvement of members 
of society in research relate to the discussions here but are 
beyond the paper’s scope.
Two points follow from clarifying the relevant question of 
‘what specific research ought to be conducted?’ First the ques-
tion is one that can provoke reasonable disagreement. The 
researcher might assert his right to proceed. The funder may 
not see the potential social benefit of the research and so opt to 
support another ‘more useful’ project. An independent assessor 
(for example) may think that the research’s risks outweigh its 
benefits and so object to it in its current form. In each case, 
the reasons given draw on an ethically relevant consideration. 
Notice that the possibility of reasonable disagreement does not 
imply anything about actual disagreement: some research proj-
ects may seem ethically unproblematic. It does, however, mean 
that we need to be careful about the process by which we assess 
the ethically relevant considerations.
Second, any decision in answer to this question should be 
given pre-emptively. Those who reject the idea that research 
ethics governance should be pre-emptive simply fail to see that 
there can be reasonable disagreement about whether the research 
should proceed. The arguments above illustrate why this view is 
unsustainable.
Given the question and the possibility of reasonable disagree-
ment about what research should proceed, we require a method 
for making decisions that takes account of the ethically relevant 
considerations in order to reach a judgement. We suggest that a 
model of fair process, akin to the ‘Accountability for Reasonable-
ness’ model, can be adopted here.37–41
Daniels and Sabin’s original model of fair process in priority 
setting works in the context of reasonable disagreement about 
how the available resources ought to be divided.37 This model 
maintains that normative legitimacy and fairness are achieved 
by putting in place a just procedure. Normative legitimacy is 
secured through the process by which the decisions are made. 
Broadly, a fair procedure is one that would be agreed on by 
reasonable persons in the appropriate state of ignorance. The 
model involves four conditions that are necessary for a fair 
procedure.37 In the description below we have adapted (and 
slightly paraphrased) them to the research context. The brackets 
signify our insertions.
1. Publicity: Decisions regarding [research proposals] and their 
rationales must be made publicly accessible.
2. Relevance: The rationales for decisions should reasonably 
explain [the grounds for not permitting a piece of research]. 
Specifically, a rationale is reasonable if it appeals to evi-
dence, reasons and principles that are accepted as relevant 
by fair-minded people who are disposed to finding mutually 
justifiable terms of cooperation.
3. Revision and appeal: There must be (1) mechanisms for chal-
lenging and resolving disputes about decisions, and (2) more 
broadly, scope to revise [decisions about the permissibility of 
research] in light of new evidence.
4. Regulative: The process [of ethical oversight] should be reg-
ulated (voluntarily or publicly) to ensure that conditions 1–3 
are met.
There is more to be said about the application of these condi-
tions to research ethics governance than there is room for here. 
However, a number of comments are in order. First, each of the 
conditions helps to develop the connection between a system 
of governance and broader society, thus ensuring accountability. 
This accountability is important if the system is to be a fair one. 
The conditions represent appropriate checks and balances on the 
system that ensure that the rationales are relevant and provide a 
reasonable explanation.40
Second, as it does for Daniels and Sabin, the relevance condi-
tion plays a significant role in the justificatory story. What counts 
as relevant in a particular context will depend on what the prop-
erly disposed fair-minded person would find relevant. It may 
be objected that the idea of a fair-minded person is circular: a 
reasonable person is just someone who happens to reflect the 
dominant social paradigm, that is, what we happen to think is 
reasonable.
On our account, however, the reasonable person is defined 
in a non-circular way: this person recognises that the decision 
about a research project’s permissibility is to be made in the 
context of reasonable disagreement. She genuinely attempts to 
consider the issues and judge the various reasons impartially. In 
contrast, someone is unreasonable if they think that all social 
research is a waste of time and money, as is someone who is 
oblivious to counterarguments to the research.
For our purposes, what is most important is that the account 
adequately supports the justification of a research ethics gover-
nance system. In the context of reasonable disagreement, and 
given that a decision needs to be made, this model establishes 
a fair process or system for deciding on the appropriateness of 
particular research projects. It does not overly restrict the kinds 
of considerations that are relevant, and is importantly character-
ised by an emphasis on the accountability for the reasonableness 
of decisions.
In concrete terms, this model provides the framework to 
justify a committee structure. It also has the normative resources 
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operating procedures. Its appeal is in providing a context in 
which to balance out each of the considerations that are rele-
vant to particular research proposals, without having to specify 
in advance either the form of this balancing or the ethically 
significant features of the context. So, in this framework, each of 
the considerations discussed in the second section above (which 
failed to provide a general grounding for governance but which 
retain ethical significance in the assessment of research) will very 
likely feature as considerations relevant to the decision-making. 
Thus the freedom to conduct research, the research’s overall 
value to science and to society more broadly, and its participants’ 
welfare are all pertinent considerations that can form the basis of 
reasonable decisions about research.
Most importantly, we take this model to provide a framework 
that is flexible in how it can handle different kinds of research 
raising different ethical issues. In the first section, we registered 
our concerns about the inappropriate application of the ‘medical 
model’ of governance to social research. Our model allows that 
a governance system may develop so that it can devolve respon-
sibility and introduce mechanisms of proportionate review. 
The principles and processes implied by the accountability for 
reasonableness model can equally be applied to the system itself: 
changes to its specific structure and the form of its consider-
ations can be justified through the proper consideration and 
articulation of relevant reasons. So, for example, if a certain 
form of research regularly raises one set of ethical concerns 
which are dealt with in the same way, the system ‘learns’ by 
establishing a pro forma or template that focuses the scrutiny in 
certain areas. The system still discriminates appropriately but at 
two stages: the primary stage of deciding whether a project qual-
ifies for the pro forma and the secondary stage of focused scru-
tiny. Such results of system learning would need to be adopted 
and approved in the appropriate way and should be audited at 
regular intervals.
The system of governance may also be adapted to particular 
challenges that the research poses. For example, a research 
opportunity may present itself in a remote location with no time 
for prospective REC review and approval. The REC might depu-
tise individuals ‘on the ground’ with prior research expertise and 
familiarity with the local context to represent their interests (the 
interests of the system). Deputies could liaise with the research 
team and report back to the committee on the progress of the 
research. Again, this form of system devolution is one that could 
be considered as a part of the accountability for reasonable-
ness model: if the relevant reasons are considered together, the 
system itself can be adjusted. In this example, there would again 
be questions about audit, as well as questions about the deputies’ 
accountability to the committee.
ConCludIng rEmArks
We have defended a general claim for a system of research ethics 
governance in social research. This general claim, and the way 
in which we have developed it into a more specific framework 
for governance, is mindful of the practical concerns that have 
been raised about the governance mechanisms in place for 
social research. Together, the arguments for this claim provide a 
constructive and general response to those who have presented 
piecemeal arguments against research ethics governance in social 
research.
We have argued that society has a stake in social research 
because of its link to enquiry. Enquiry, we suggested, is a consti-
tutive element of human flourishing, and society ought to be 
concerned with the flourishing of its members. Social research 
is one form of enquiry, institutionalised in particular ways and 
according to certain trajectories of tradition and social conven-
tion. So society has a stake in social research. Identifying this 
stake does not settle questions about the extent and nature of 
the involvement of society in research, but the investigations of 
this stake identify a number of ethical considerations that are 
relevant for understanding this involvement.
Importantly, individual members of society can reasonably 
disagree about what specific research should be conducted 
within a society. This reasonable disagreement justifies imple-
menting a ‘fair process’ model of governance that will enable 
these decisions to be made ethically. The ‘accountability for 
reasonableness’ model outlined above helps structure the overall 
way in which research ethics governance might be organised. 
This model is flexible and reflexive, and as such is well suited to 
the methodological and practical concerns of social researchers.
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